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 of January, 2010, a gigantic mass of rocks came down the slope above 
Attabad, a village in the high mountain area of Gilgit-Baltistan, northern 
Pakistan. The large-scale landslide filled the narrow valley of the Hunza-River, 
burying part of the village and the neighbouring hamlet of Sarat. It did not come 
unanticipated. Already years before widening cracks had appeared on the slope. 
Attabad had been evacuated but a number of families returned. The landslide 
claimed nineteen lives. While this was disastrous enough, a second disaster de-
veloped in consequence of the first. The debris created a huge barrier of more 
than hundred metres height and one kilometre width which completely blocked 
the flow of the Hunza-River and also buried the Karakorum Highway (KKH), 
the only road link to the area. Consequentially, the whole area upstream, the 
tahsil (subdistrict) of Gojal, was cut off from access to Pakistan. In the subse-
quent weeks a lake developed behind the barrier which continued to grow till 
August 2010. Until then it had reached a length of almost thirty kilometres. The 
lake inundated one village completely and four others partly. Large sections of 
the KKH came under water so that also communication between the villages 
was severely disrupted. 
A growing body of literature of the anthropology of disasters has pointed out 
that “natural disasters” are in fact not simply “natural”. Taking mostly a political 
ecology perspective which emphasises the close connection, interdependency 
and, practically, mutual constitution of “nature” and “society”, it has been ar-
gued that disasters occur when events that are characterised as being “natural” 
(i.e. not man-made) impact upon vulnerable human, social spaces. The concept 
of vulnerability, in a nutshell, provides the link between the “social” and the 
“natural”. “… Vulnerability is the conceptual nexus that links the relationship 
that people have with their environment to social forces and institutions and the 
cultural values that sustain or contest them”, writes Anthony Oliver-Smith 
(2007: 10). It is always a particular complex of social, political, and cultural 
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configurations that makes people in particular places vulnerable to specific 
events. 
Many of the people who are affected by the Attabad landslide hold a slightly 
different view of the relationship between “natural” and “man-made” disasters. 
For them, the disaster was natural in the beginning but subsequently turned into 
a man-made disaster. According to their perspective it became a man-made dis-
aster because insufficient steps were taken by the regional and national authori-
ties to prevent more damage. In local discourse about the Attabad disaster, refer-
ences to “government” abound. In local perspective, the disaster has a very close 
connection with the political sphere. This chapter explores interconnections 
between “disaster” and “politics” in the case of the Attabad landslide. It focuses 
more on the second part of the disaster, the inundation of the villages, than on 
the first, the burying of Attabad village. 
Prominent examples of anthropological studies of disaster have pointed out 
that in many cases the impact of a cataclysmic event initially erases social 
structure. Immediately after the impact social differences like class and hierar-
chy (probably to a lesser extent perhaps also gender) often give way to a liminal 
phase of communitas and solidarity (Oliver-Smith 1999; Schlehe 2006). If we 
take the convenient categorization of post-disaster action and experience into the 
three phases of “rescue”, “relief” and “reconstruction”, it is the rescue phase 
which is frequently characterised by solidarity and a lack of discrimination. So-
cial structure is restored after a certain time, often with the onset of relief opera-
tions. While social differentiation re-emerges with relief it seems that political 
action related with disaster is more often connected with reconstruction efforts. 
In the story of the Yungay earthquake and landslide Anthony Oliver-Smith nar-
rates that political mobilisation of the victims started in opposition to govern-
ment’s resettlement plans (Oliver-Smith 1986: 203ff.). Both Oliver-Smith and 
Schlehe write that interventions of agents from outside the affected community 
play a significant role in the re-emergence of social order and in the inception of 
political mobilisation. 
In the case of the Attabad landslide and lake, however, things were different. 
The inundation of villages was not a sudden, unreckoned event that took the af-
fected villagers by surprise. To the contrary, the disaster approached slowly in 
the shape of the daily rising waters of the newly formed lake. Many people told 
me that from day one after the landslide they expected their houses to be inun-
dated. They had time to cope with the anticipated flooding. Although solidarity 
with the victims played an important role in the affected villages, there was ap-
parently no phase of undifferentiated communitas. Instead, political action 
started almost immediately after the impact of the event. 
I use a quite conventional understanding of “politics” in this chapter. While 
in much anthropological writing the concept of “politics” has been extended to 
refer to all kind of power relations, including, for instance, power relations 
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within the “private” realm of the family, I limit my discussion to the sphere of 
public action in relation with government. This does not mean that I regard other 
realms of action, like those within the family, as non-political, but simply that 
there is sufficient “conventional politics” to be discussed in relation to the 
Attabad disaster. 
My analysis of the disaster is based on two short research trips of altogether 
five weeks duration to Gilgit-Baltistan and Gojal in November 2010 and Febru-
ary 2011.1 In the affected area I stayed in the village Gulmit which is the 
administrative centre of the sub-district Gojal. Reports on the Internet blog 
Pamir Times are a very important source, too. Further, my understanding is in-
formed by my general acquaintance with Gilgit-Baltistan which started from my 
doctoral fieldwork in Gilgit in the early 1990s. 
This article proceeds as follows: First I will introduce the area and the people 
affected by the landslide. Then I will narrate with more detail the unfolding of 
the disaster, the ways, in which people were affected and attempted to cope with 
it, including relief efforts by government(s) and non-governmental organisation. 
After that I will detail and analyse political action that emerged with the disaster 
but was “rooted” in pre-disaster political dynamics. 
 
2. Gojal and Gilgit-Baltistan 
Gojal is a sparsely populated arid high mountain area spread over 8,500 km². 
Villages are situated at an altitude between 2,300 and 3,200 meters. The popula-
tion of Gojal is around 20,000 people.2 Settlements are found in the main valley 
which is formed by the Hunza-River and in the side valleys of Shimshal and 
Chupursan. The main valley was connected by the KKH which runs alongside 
the Hunza River and crosses into the Chinese Province of Xinjiang over the 
Khunjerab Pass at an altitude of 4,690 m. The KKH is the only road link be-
tween Pakistan and China. The valley of Shimshal has a road link with the KKH 
and the main area of Gojal only since 2003. Economy in the area is largely 
agrarian. Cultivation depends on irrigation which is fed by melt water from 
glaciers. 
While it would be wrong to insinuate that the area had been completely iso-
lated before the opening of the KKH in 1978, it is certainly true that the High-
way had a very important impact on society in terms of links and communica-
                                                 
1  Without the help of many friends from the area such a short period of research would have 
produced very meagre results. I am particularly indebted to Fazal Amin Beg, Adil Shah 
and Zulfiqar Ali. The responsibility for any flaw of the article is, however, entirely mine. I 
am also indepted to the Swiss National Science Foundation for funding the trips. 
2  Some documents give a population figure of more than 25,000, but this probably includes 
many people who have migrated from Gojal and now live in different cities of Pakistan. 
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tion. The Highway brought a significant transformation of economy in Gojal.3 
While before the opening of the KKH economy was largely nonmonetary and 
subsistence-oriented, transport facilities enabled the cultivation of cash crops. 
Before the disaster, the cultivation of potatoes was the most important source of 
income in Gojal. Other significant road-related sectors of economy were tourism 
(including trekking tourism) and small-scale trade with China. The Highway 
also facilitated migration to down-country Pakistan for the purpose of work and 
education. The KKH formed the backbone of economy in Gojal, yet the road 
link was always precarious. Because of the hazardous high-mountain environ-
ment landslides and rockfalls that block the KKH consecutively for days or even 
weeks are quite common.  
 
Sketchmap of Gojal (not to scale). 
 
                                                 
3  On social changes brought by the KKH see Kreutzmann 1991. 
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Politically, Gojal is part of Gilgit-Baltistan. In consequence of the Kashmir 
dispute, the region which until 2009 was called “Northern Areas of Pakistan” is 
under the control of Pakistan yet does not form a constitutional part of this 
country. After 1947, Gilgit-Baltistan was considered a “disputed area” the in-
habitants of which have no right to participate in Pakistan’s formal political pro-
cesses. Most importantly, they do not have the right to cast their votes in elec-
tions for Pakistan’s National Assembly (Sökefeld 1997a, 2005). 
Until the 1970s, parts of Gilgit-Baltistan were administered by more or less 
autonomous local rulers. Gojal was part of the small kingdom of Hunza under 
the rule of the Mir of Hunza. The kingdom was divided into three parts: Shinaki, 
Central Hunza and Gojal. Hunza society was characterized by a strict hierarchy 
in which the lower strata were required to pay heavy agricultural taxes and to 
provide forced labour to the king. Central Hunza was the most privileged part of 
the state as taxation was considerably higher in Shinaki and especially in Gojal, 
yet rigid stratification prevailed also in Central Hunza.4 
The Mir’s exploitative regime was abolished only in 1974 by the Pakistani 
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto initiated a first step in a series of po-
litical reforms of Gilgit-Baltistan. In 2009, the up until now last of these reforms 
brought a kind of limited self-rule to the area. Since then, Gilgit-Baltistan has a 
Legislative Assembly and a Government under a Chief Minister who is elected 
by the Legislative Assembly. At present, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has 
the majority in the Assembly and like the Government of Pakistan the Govern-
ment of Gilgit-Baltistan belongs to this party. Political competences of both As-
sembly and Government of Gilgit-Baltistan, however, are very restricted. Beside 
the Chief Minister there is a governor who is appointed by the federal govern-
ment of Pakistan. The more important administrative and political issues are un-
der the authority of the Government of Pakistan through its Minister of Kashmir 
Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan. 
The relationship between Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan is still at issue. Most 
of the politically aware inhabitants of the area demand the full integration of 
Gilgit-Baltistan into the Pakistani State as its fifth province, beside the existing 
provinces of Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Baluchistan. With the 
reform of 2009, the political setup of Gilgit-Baltistan has become to some extent 
province-like, but still it is not a province. A vocal minority, however, rejects 
Pakistan completely and demands the area’s full independence (Sökefeld 1999). 
Gojal is a tahsil (sub-district) of Hunza-Nager District. The landslide oc-
curred at the border between Central Hunza and Gojal. Attabad is the last village 
of Central Hunza and the area affected by the lake falls entirely within Gojal. 
The principal village of Gojal is Gulmit (population ca. 2,500), the tahsil head-
                                                 
4  On historical social structure in Hunza and Gojal see Kreutzmann 1989: 166ff; 1996: 
282ff. 
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quarters, which before the disaster had a bazaar of more than 130 shops. The 
village houses local administration and facilities like a post office, a bank and a 
hospital, which, however, is not permanently staffed. For many if not most ser-
vices the people of Gojal depend on access to Aliabad, the principal place of 
Hunza, or Gilgit, the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan. Gojal is linked with both places 
by the KKH. 
Another important village of Gojal is Sost where a dry port for China trade is 
situated. As long as the Khunjerab Pass is open, i.e. from May to December 
every year, goods are loaded from Chinese trailers onto Pakistani trucks and, to 
a lesser extent, vice versa at Sost. Large-scale trade with China is dominated by 
traders from down-country Pakistan, most importantly Punjabis and Pashtun. 
Gojal is inhabited by people belonging to two ethno-linguistic groups, 
Wakhis and Burusho.5 Wakhis form the majority and Burusho live in a few vil-
lages only. Historically, Wakhis constituted a subordinate segment of society 
and were subject to heavy taxation by the Mir of Hunza who himself was a 
Burusho. Both Wakhi and Burusho belong to the Ismailiyya, the Islamic com-
munity which is headed by the Aga Khan. Ismailis are organised through a hier-
archy of Ismaili councils which provide religious and social services. 
Religious affiliation is highly significant for the economic and social devel-
opment of the area because it implies the very strong commitment of the various 
institutions of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). For many individ-
uals in Gojal and Hunza, the commitment to AKDN has a strong connotation of 
moral obligation towards the Aga Khan. 
The most important of these institutions is the Aga Khan Rural Support Pro-
gramme (AKRSP) which started to work in Gojal in 1983 by initiating the vol-
untary self-organisation of the local population into Village Organisations and 
Women’s Organisations (VO/WOs).6 VO/WOs are groups who collect savings 
and give loans to their members for business, educational or health purposes. 
The VO/WOs of several villages together form Local Support Organisations 
(LSOs) which undertake larger projects with the help of AKRSP. 
Different kinds of formal voluntary organisation have become very common 
in Gojal. For example, there is in almost every village a community school 
which is organised and funded by the parents. These schools are generally be-
lieved to be of higher standards than government schools. While the language of 
instruction in government schools is Urdu, community schools are mostly Eng-
lish medium schools. Compared to other parts of Pakistan, the level of education 
in Gojal and Hunza for both females and males is extraordinarily high. In the 
younger generation, the literacy rate reaches hundred percent. The value of edu-
                                                 
5  Beside there is a very small minority of Domaki-speaking people, comprising a few 
households only. 
6  On the work of AKRSP in Gilgit-Baltistan see Wood, Malik and Sagheer 2006. 
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cation was very successfully inculcated by AKDN and most parents shun no 
efforts to provide their sons and daughters with a good education. Many young 
Gojalis study at universities in Gilgit, Rawalpindi, Lahore, or Karachi. 
 
3. After the landslide: the unfolding of disaster 
The impact of the landslide of 4
th
 of January 2010 was immediately felt in many 
parts of Gojal. A large cloud of dust emerged from Attabad and reached even 
Gulmit at a distance of around 15 km. When people rushed to the site and saw 
the magnitude of the landslide, they were immediately worried. They realised 
that they were cut off from Pakistan and anticipated the formation of the lake 
which would threaten their villages. Fazal Abbas, a villager from Ayeenabad 
which is only a few kilometres from the site of the slide, told me that he and his 
co-villagers immediately started to prepare for the disaster. They moved their 
possessions to the upper parts of the village, dismantled the houses in the lower 
part in order to save precious construction materials like wooden beams and 
door frames and even cut the trees. About twenty days after the landslide the 
lake reached Ayeenabad and started to submerge houses. At the same time the 
section of the KKH between Ayeenabad and the barrier was flooded. It was no 
longer possible to reach the blockade by road from the Gojal side. That time, 
water level was increasing by more than 0.5 meters per day. 
Because the road was blocked, about two hundred people from Gojal were 
stranded at Aliabad in Hunza. Gojal could only be reached by helicopters. Ser-
vices were provided by the Pakistani Army and the National Disaster Manage-
ment Authority, NDMA. Yet due to difficult weather conditions and limited re-
sources helicopter sorties were often suspended for several consecutive days. 
The service was not enough to provide the people of the area with all necessi-
ties. Anticipating a prolonged blockade of the KKH, Gojalis had immediately 
rushed to the shops and stores to acquire provisions for their households. After a 
few days, shops were virtually empty. 
On January 10, Qamar Zaman Qaira, the then governor of Gilgit-Baltistan 
rushed to Hunza and delivered speeches in Altit and Gulmit, promising that the 
Pakistani government would take all efforts for the relief and rehabilitation of 
the affected people. In the last days of the month, the Frontier Works Organisa-
tion (FWO), an engineering body of the Pakistani Army, started to work on the 
blockade, attempting to cut a spillway through the debris. A provisional access 
road was constructed to reach the lake from the KKH across the blockade. At 
this time, the spillway point was still more than eighty meters above the water 
level and the lake had already reached a length of eleven kilometers. 
In mid-February the NDMA brought some motor boats in order to transport 
people across the lake. Yet the boats turned out to be old, leaky and quite unsafe. 
In March, traders eager to resume business with China launched larger wooden 
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boats on the lake which also took passengers. By these boats Gojal was recon-
nected with Pakistan, but travel became troublesome, time-consuming and ex-
pensive. 
Five villages were directly endangered by the rising water level: Ayeenabad, 
Shishkat, Gulmit, Ghulkin and Husseini. In late May the water started to spill 
over the debris. Ayeenabad was completely submerged now, as was the greater 
part of Shishkat. In Gulmit the low lying parts of Goze and the bazaar area along 
the KKH were inundated. The main parts of Ghulkin and Husseini are situated 
higher above the floor of the valley. Here only a few houses close to the erst-
while river were affected. Although the level of the lake had reached the spilling 
point it continued to rise due to increased inflow of melt-water from the glaciers 
during summer until end of August. The lake had a length of approximately 
twenty-eight kilometers then. In addition to destroying buildings, the lake also 
claimed fields, gardens and tree plantations. Especially many apricot and other 
fruit trees which play a significant role in local diet died because they do not en-
dure wet conditions. 
With reduced inflow from the glaciers in autumn, the water level receded to 
some extent. In Gulmit, some fields and buildings re-emerged, now covered by a 
thick layer of sand and silt. 
Locally, two categories of disaster affected people are distinguished. Directly 
affected are all those who suffered loss of property (houses, land, shops) due to 
the landslide or inundation. Taking the loss of houses as indicator, around 380 
families are directly affected. Because these people have lost their homes and 
had to move elsewhere they are also called IDPs (internally displaced persons), 
a designation which has become very popular in Pakistan after the displacement 
of thousands of people in consequence of the war between army and Taliban in 
Swat in 2009. Besides the directly affected IDPs there are those who are indi-
rectly affected and this category comprises the whole remaining population of 
Gojal. They are affected by the serious consequences of disturbed transport and 
communication. 
 
The Attabad landslide and the politics of disaster in Gojal, Gilgit-Baltistan 185 
 
 
Houses destroyed by landslide 
Attabad and Sarat 
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Losses in Hunza and Gojal due to Attabad landslide and lake formation. 
Source: Early Recovery Plan and Framework for Disaster-Affected Areas of Hunza-Gojal, 
AKRSP 2010. 
 
Over the summer months, a new routine of transport developed. Goods 
coming from China are brought from Sost to Husseini where the KKH disap-
pears into the lake and where mostly local workers load them onto the boats. 
The boat trip to the spillway takes between ninety minutes and two hours. At the 
spillway, labourers, mostly men from other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan, especially 
from Nager, unload the goods from the boats and put them on jeeps or tractors 
which carry them on a dirt-road across the debris down to the KKH where the 
goods are finally loaded on trucks. Transport rates have risen sharply because 
goods have to be reloaded three times. Boats coming from Husseini are gener-
ally fully loaded and go directly to the spillway. Passengers who are taken along 
frequently have to sit precariously on top of the load. Boats going in the oppo-
site direction are mostly half empty and call also at Shishkat and Gulmit to de-
liver goods and passengers there. Passengers from Gulmit who want to travel to 
the spillway often have to take a launch to Husseini first. When I was in Gulmit 
in November 2010, thirty-three boats plied the lake. The cost of a trip from 
Gulmit to Aliabad has doubled and the travel time increased more than three-
fold. Most Gojalis regard the boat trip as very risky. It is especially problematic 
in cases of medical emergency. 
In winter, this travel routine was disturbed again. Because of extreme cold 
the lake froze between Shishkat and Husseini. From the spillway, boats could 
only go up to Shiskhat. In January, the Chinese goods were carried or dragged 
over the ice from Husseini to Shishkat where they were loaded onto the boats. 
Due to strong winds and high waves boat services were completely suspended 
for several weeks from mid-January and Gojal was cut off again. Several boats 
were damaged or even destroyed by ice. In February, the ice broke and boat 
transport was resumed. 
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Travelling by boat across the lake (Photo: Martin Sökefeld). 
 
4. Economic consequences of disconnection 
Because in many respects life in Gojal depends on the KKH, the obstruction of 
transport and communication had dramatic effects. I will focus here especially 
on economy/agriculture and education. 
Gojal is no more a self-sufficient subsistence economy. Although most fam-
ilies still produce part of their food themselves, economy and life depend largely 
on monetary income. Income opportunities, however, were badly affected by the 
lake. This is most obvious in the case of tourism. In the past, many Gojalis were 
engaged in tourism as guides and tour operators or as restaurant or hotel owners. 
Tourists came from Western countries and Japan. International tourism was al-
ready badly hit by terrorism in Pakistan and the country’s devastating security 
situation. After the Attabad landslide, tourism in Gojal was reduced to zero. On 
one hand, tourists simply did not travel any more to the area; on the other, tour-
ism infrastructure has also been seriously damaged. In Gulmit, all hotels except 
one are closed. Several hotels have been destroyed by water. 
Even more significant than tourism in terms of loss of income is the effect of 
the lake on agriculture. Over the last decades, the cultivation of potatoes as cash 
crop has become the most important source of income for Gojalis. Potatoes were 
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bought by traders from Punjab or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa who transported the 
crop to markets of down-country Pakistan. For Gojalis the profit from the sale of 
potatoes was sufficient to enable certain prosperity and also to meet the ex-
penses for educating one’s children. 
After the landslide and the blockade of the KKH the farmers anticipated on 
one hand great difficulties in marketing their crops and on the other problems to 
import sufficient food into the area. When the agricultural season started in 
March, many farmers therefore decided not to plant potatoes for sale but wheat 
for home consumption. In Gojal, as in other parts of South Asia, potatoes are not 
regarded as staple food but as vegetable which is eaten in addition to staples like 
flat bread made from wheat, or rice. In early summer 2010 a food crisis seemed 
imminent because of the difficulty of food imports. It was, however, averted by 
food relief. In order to explain the critical situation, the coordinator of the World 
Food Programme, who is from Gojal himself, told me: “There was such a scar-
city of food that the people started to eat their potatoes.” 
In spite of the much reduced supply of potatoes, traders offered only dra-
matically reduced rates in autumn. While one būri of potatoes (100 kg) had 
fetched more than 2,000 PKR7 the year before, farmers were initially offered 
only 700 PKR in 2010. The traders argued that they were not in a position to pay 
more because they had to bear the much increased transport rates. The farmers 
were not in a bargaining position. At that time many of them had spent most of 
their savings and were desperate in need of cash; they were forced to sell their 
produce at almost any rate. Some farmers who were able to wait a little longer 
until selling their crops got around 1,200 PKR per būri. Because of both reduced 
crops and low rates, the income derived from potatoes decreased dramatically. 
In Gulmit also the bazaar economy was badly hit. The central bazaar was 
situated along the KKH. Around 130 shops were inundated. Only few of the 
shops could be reopened at other places of the village. Most of the shopkeepers 
lost their income as did the shop owners who are normally paid a monthly rent 
by the shopkeepers. 
Thus while on one hand most people lost much of their monetary income, 
local bazaar rates of most goods increased by at least thirty percent. This had 
dramatic effects on voluntary organisations. Almost nobody was in a position to 
put further savings into VO/WOs and those who had taken out loans were often 
unable to pay their instalments. Before the landslide the payment moral had 
been very good and loans had rarely been defaulted. 
Many parents stopped paying their children’s fees for the community 
schools. The headmaster of Al Amyn Model School in Gulmit told me that fees 
continued to be paid for only thirty percent of the pupils. While before there had 
been a close relationship between school and parents, most defaulting parents 
                                                 
7  Ca. 17 Euro. At that time one Euro equalled 115 PKR. 
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now felt highly embarrassed and avoided any contact. As a consequence, the 
school was unable to pay the teachers’ regular salaries. After negotiations, the 
teachers agreed to work on reduced pay; otherwise the school would have to be 
closed. 
The disaster also contributed to a severe energy crisis. Electricity for Gojal is 
generated by a hydro power station in Khyber village, further up the valley. In 
winter, one of the two turbines working at the power station broke down. Be-
cause of the lake it could not be transported to a workshop in Gilgit for repair. In 
consequence, shortage of electricity increased dramatically. While before elec-
tricity had been available for roughly half the day, supply was now reduced to 
six hours every three days. 
As was emphasised before, most parents are willing to invest much money in 
the education of their children. Educating one’s children well is among the most 
important social values in Gojal. Many students are sent to educational institu-
tions in Hunza, Gilgit, or down-country Pakistan where they do not only have to 
pay for tuition fees but also for boarding in student hostels. Both students and 
parents fear that they have to discontinue courses sooner or later if families are 
unable to meet expenses. For most people in Gojal, this is the most disastrous 
consequence of the landslide. They say that while a destroyed house can be re-
built after some years a lost education cannot be recovered. People fear that the 
disaster will have lasting effects on their children’s future. 
Beside all the negative economic consequences of the landslide it has to be 
mentioned that the disaster also created some economic opportunities. Most im-
portantly, the loading of goods at Husseini village from trucks onto the boats 
provides income to local men. When I visited the place in February 2011, 
around 120 men were involved in this work. While most of the porters at this 
end of the lake are from the surrounding Wakhi villages, almost none of the 
porters at the spillway are from Gojal. Most porters earn between 1,000 to 2,000 
PKR per day. Given that the recommended minimum wage in Pakistan is pres-
ently 7,000 PKR per month this is quite a good income. When the lake was fro-
zen and goods had to be carried and dragged over the ice to Shishkat, opportu-
nities were even better. At that time even white-collar employees like teachers 
took to portering. Men were paid 1,000 PKR per tour from Husseini to Shishkat 
and some men were able to do five tours per day. 
Another economic opportunity is the boat traffic. Up until now, however, 
only two of the boats on the lake are owned and operated by locals. For tourism, 
the lake itself might once become an opportunity. This, however, would presup-
pose the reconstruction of infrastructure (hotels and restaurants) and much more 
convenient access to the area. 
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5. Coping with rising waters 
This section deals with various efforts to cope and manage with the landslide 
and the lake. Some coping strategies by traders (establishing a transport system 
across the lake) and households (planting wheat instead of potatoes) have al-
ready been referred to in the last chapter. Concerning households, the relocation 
of housing of IDPs has to be added. When the water approached houses in 
Ayeenabad, Shishkat and Gulmit families moved their households. This was a 
collective affair in which the directly affected families were assisted by Ismaili 
volunteers. These volunteers were organised by the Ismaili Council which 
through local Jamaat Khanas (Ismaili religious and community centres) an-
nounced time and place of action. The volunteers helped the affected families to 
pack their belongings and to either store them at a safe place or shift them to 
their new, temporary place of accommodation. Further, they cut trees and dis-
mantled houses before they were submerged in order to save construction mate-
rials like beams and door and window frames. For the concerned families this 
assistance was indispensable. Many affected family members felt paralyzed and 
were completely unable to take part in the dismantling of their own houses. Vol-
unteers also cared especially for women and children and kept them away from 
the sites of disaster in order to prevent further trauma. While IDPs from Gulmit 
could be accommodated in the houses of relatives within the village, IDPs from 
Ayeenabad and Shishkat shifted to rented accommodation in Aliabad, Central 
Hunza. 
Besides coping efforts at the household level, there were a lot of disaster 
managing activities undertaken by institutions like government, NGOs, and in-
ternational organisations. Even in the case of a spatially limited disaster like the 
Attabad landslide, which, compared with other catastrophes like the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of 2004 or the Japanese earthquake cum tsunami of 2011, affects 
a relatively small number of people, efforts towards disaster management create 
a very complex space of action in which many agents are involved. To a great 
extent, complexity derives from the fact that none of the institutions involved 
actually constitutes a clearly bounded, unified actor. Taking “government” as an 
example, there is the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Gilgit-
Baltistan, there are governmental institutions like the National Disaster Man-
agement Authority (NDMA) and the army, and there are individual politicians 
like ministers and members of the Legislative Assembly. This complexity is of-
ten eclipsed in local discourse which mostly refers simply to “the Government”, 
implying not only a homogeneous institution but also a difference or even an 
antagonism between government and the local, affected population. 
Broadly, three realms of such disaster management activities can be distin-
guished: First, the efforts to cut a spillway through the debris of the landslide in 
order to release the water; second, efforts to provide affected households with 
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relief goods, especially to prevent severe food crisis; and third, miscellaneous 
measures like a business revitalisation and a cash-for-work programme. 
Efforts to cut a spillway through the debris started in late January 2010 when 
this task was given to the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) of the Pakistani 
Army. Given the gigantic size of the blockade most local observers doubted that 
FWO was capable of completing this assignment. Still, while visiting the sites of 
disaster, politicians announced several times that the debris would be cleared 
within a few weeks. Most locals had much more confidence in the abilities of 
Chinese companies and engineers and demanded from the beginning that “the 
Chinese” should be engaged.8 Yet this did not happen. Over the months, it be-
came clear that FWO indeed was incapable to reach the set target. FWO suc-
ceeded in cutting a spillway through the debris, but this spillway was neither 
deep nor wide enough to prevent the further increase of the lake even after the 
spilling point had been reached. In the course of the year, the goal of action was 
changed. Now the idea is to lower the level of the lake by thirty meters so that 
most stretches of the KKH would come out of the water. In December, the Paki-
stani National Highway Authority and the China Road and Bridge Corporation 
signed a 275 million USD agreement for the reconstruction of the KKH. The 
project is scheduled for completion in two years, but given the hugeness of con-
struction work involved this, too, seems hardly feasible.9 
In December 2010 and January 2011, FWO completely blocked the outflow 
of water from the lake in order to deepen the spillway. When the outflow was 
opened again, water remained largely at the same level. The procedure was re-
peated in February/ March 2011, without much effect. 
Relief efforts concerned especially the provision of food items to the affected 
population. I am concerned here with relief within Gojal and not with the villag-
ers of Attabad who were shifted to camps in Altit village in Central Hunza. In 
spring, initial relief was provided on a smaller scale by organisations like the 
Pakistan Red Crescent Society and FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance, the disas-
ter management organisation of AKDN, to the directly affected families. It is 
said that also the provincial government of Punjab which is headed by the Paki-
stan Muslim League, the main contender of the PPP, sent a few trucks with re-
lief goods to the area but I was unable to find out, who ultimately received these 
goods. 
                                                 
8  Chinese construction agencies have a lot of experience in the region. They built large sec-
tions of the KKH and are currently engaged in widening and reconstructing the Highway. 
9  According to the agreement, seven kilometres of the KKH will be rehabilitated and seven-
teen kilometres have to be constructed anew. The project involves the construction of two 
tunnels of a combined length of 5.7 kilometers and seven high-level bridges (Chinese Em-
bassy 2010). 
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Later, relief was extended to the indirectly affected people in Gojal, that is, 
to the whole population of the tahsil. End of July 2010 the Chinese government 
offered relief to Gojal and during September around 3,000 tons of food items 
including wheat flour, rice, sugar, milk powder and cooking oil were transported 
to Sost dry port. It is said that these supplies were enough to feed Gojal for six 
months. Apparently, the Chinese government had intended to send relief to the 
flood victims in down-country Pakistan, but as the KKH was blocked and 
transport was difficult the Government of Pakistan asked China to give the relief 
to Gojal instead. The Chinese relief was distributed through a newly formed Re-
lief Committee which was established by the government of Gilgit-Baltistan. 
Many people allege that the committee consisted of PPP supporters only and 
that it favoured party allies. 
The Chinese relief consignment also contained fuel (petrol and diesel) and 
coal. Both were meant to be given free of charge to the households. Yet only the 
coal was distributed; it was badly needed in winter for heating purposes. The 
fuel, however, was claimed by the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan. Officials told 
that the fuel would be sold to meet expenses of the disaster but local people gen-
erally doubted this intention. They alleged, rather, that the fuel was given clan-
destinely to the government’s cronies and that any profit derived from its sale 
went into the pockets of the officials. In any case, it remained unclear how and 
by whom the fuel was utilized. 
Already in early summer 2010 the World Food Programme (WFP) had be-
gun to plan a relief operation for Gojal but this operation was delayed by the 
floods that struck Pakistan in late July and August. Because in the meanwhile 
the Chinese Government had started to dispatch food relief to Gojal, the WFP 
reduced its own package for the area in order to prevent oversupply. Neverthe-
less, the WFP sent food items sufficient to feed Gojal for two months. This relief 
was mainly financed by USAID. The distribution of the WFP relief was as-
signed to FOCUS. As food was to be distributed according to household size, 
FOCUS relied on LSOs for the preparation of lists of beneficiaries. Ismaili Vol-
unteers also helped in the distribution of relief. 
Beside the works at the spillway and the different relief operations a number 
of smaller measures were undertaken to alleviate the consequences of the disas-
ter. Most of them were either initiated by or implemented through AKRSP. Be-
fore the disaster, the organisation did not have an office in Gojal, but in June 
2010 an Emergency Field Office of AKRSP was established in Gulmit. The 
most important projects implemented through this office were a business revi-
talisation programme and a cash-for-work project.10 The business revitalisation 
programme was devised by the NDMA, funded by USAID and implemented by 
AKRSP with the assistance of MASO, the LSO of lower Gojal. The programme 
                                                 
10  For both projects and other activities of the Emergency Field Office see AKRSP 2011. 
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gave financial assistance to those entrepreneurs who had lost their businesses to 
the lake. Depending on the magnitude of their losses they received cheques 
worth one or two lakh PKR11 which were intended to help them in restarting 
their enterprises. In October, 132 business owners, most of whom had lost a 
shop in the drowned bazaar areas of Gulmit and Shishkat, received cheques. 
Some of them were able to reopen their businesses in existing shop buildings 
which line Gulmit’s polo ground or in newly built wooden cabins. While the 
shopkeepers were happy about the assistance, the owners of the shops buildings 
which had gone under water complained that they were excluded from the 
scheme. They argued that the shopkeepers had actually suffered little damage 
because they could easily shift their merchandise before the bazaar was flooded, 
but that the shop owners were the real victims, for the shop constructions could 
not be saved. Still they did not receive any compensation for their losses. 
The cash-for-work programme was funded by the German Diakonie 
Katastrophenhilfe through the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) and 
was implemented by AKRSP, again with the assistance of MASO. IDPs and 
(non-IDP) “ultra poor” families were the beneficiaries. One person per benefi-
ciary household was employed for a period of thirty days at a wage of 300 PKR 
per day in different construction schemes. While IDPs constructed mainly cattle 
sheds, other beneficiaries were employed in the repair of link roads and canals. 
For IDPs who had shifted to Central Hunza also cash-for-training programmes 
were initiated in which mostly women participated. Altogether more than 400 
individuals took part in this project. IDPs in Gojal were also provided with one 
health and hygiene kit per household. 
Another measure that needs to be mentioned is the Government’s subsidy for 
schools. Initially, the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan announced that the Gov-
ernment would pay the fees for all pupils and students from Gojal at educational 
institutions in Gilgit-Baltistan. This promise did neither include boarding costs 
nor expenses of students outside of Gilgit-Baltistan. Further, much less was paid 
than originally announced. While the Al Amyn Model School in Gulmit, taken 
as an example, suffered a loss of about twenty lakh PKR it received only a sub-
sidy of ten lakh. Also the provincial government of Punjab promised to waive 
the fees of Gojali students at the educational institutions of Punjab but this did 
not materialise. Students were forced by colleges and universities either to pay 
or to quit. 
From the perspective of the affected people, many things were promised but 
much less delivered. Large scale action like the relief operations by China and 
the WFP totally lacked coordination. In Gojal, announcements by the Govern-
ments of Pakistan or Gilgit-Baltistan were considered with mistrust and reserva-
tion. Almost all government action was connected to rumours and reports about 
                                                 
11  One lakh equals 100,000. 
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corruption. In Gulmit and the neighbouring villages the perception of relief was 
mixed, at best. People told me repeatedly: “We do not want relief. We want the 
water to go away!” 
 
6. Political action in the context of disaster 
Public political action and mobilisation in response to the disaster started almost 
immediately after the landslide of January 4, 2010. On January 6, the Progres-
sive Youth Front held a demonstration in a bazaar in Hunza against “government 
inaction”. On January 14, the Rābita Committee Mutasirīn-e Gojal (Coordina-
tion Committee of the Affected People of Gojal) was established in Gilgit. On 
January 27 a “Save Gojal Ralley” was held in front of the Gilgit-Baltistan Leg-
islative Assembly in which both the Rābita Committee and the Balawaristan 
National Front participated. 
On January 10, Qamar Zaman Qaira, the PPP Federal Minister of Infor-
mation who was at the same time Interim Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan, came 
from Islamabad to visit Gulmit and Altit in Hunza where he distributed cheques 
to the IDPs of Attabad. On January 12, Syed Mehdi Shah, PPP Chief Minister of 
Gilgit-Baltistan, visited IDPs in Hunza and distributed cheques, too. 
These two sets of events open an arena of public political action and mobili-
sation around the Attabad disaster. On one hand, members of the Government 
visited sites of disaster or IDP camps announcing or at times publicly distrib-
uting government aid; on the other hand non-governmental actors organised 
public events to highlight the plight of the disaster victims and to blame the 
Government for not taking sufficient interest in and action against the disaster. 
As mentioned in the last section, local discourse about the disaster constructs 
an opposition between the local, affected population and the government. In this 
context, “government” cannot be understood in strictly legal terms. In local dis-
course, “government” does not refer to the executive authority only but included 
also the members of legislative assembly. The term “government” (hukumat) 
rather refers to “the body of institutionalised politics up there”, in Gilgit or in 
Islamabad.12 Especially two members of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assem-
bly (GBLA) played an important role in this discourse: Wazir Baig and Mutabiat 
Shah. Both of them belong to the PPP. Wazir Baig is the member of the GBLA 
for Hunza and Gojal. He received a large number of votes from Gojal and most 
of the people in the area are of the opinion that without their determined support 
he would not have won the seat. Wazir Baig became Speaker of the GBLA. 
From September 2010 to January 2011 he was also Acting Governor of Gilgit-
Baltistan because the previous Governor had died. Wazir Baig is from Central 
Hunza. Mutabiat Shah who is from Gulmit is a member of GBLA, too. He has 
                                                 
12  For the “vertical” conceptualisation of politics see Ferguson and Gupta 2002. 
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not been elected but was appointed as “technocrat member” of the GBLA.13 In 
local discourse, both men are considered as persons who bear a special respon-
sibility for the area, Wazir Baig because he was elected by Gojalis and Mutabiat 
Shah because he hails from the area. And both were harshly criticized for not 
taking sufficient interest in the disaster and not raising their voices for the af-
fected people. Although at least the technocrat Mutabiat Shah is a “local” in the 
strict meaning of the term, his way of (in)action after the disaster rather con-
firmed the discursive construction of an opposition or even dichotomy between 
government and the locals: Having entered the sphere of government, he ne-
glected his local obligations. 
In spite of charges that the government failed to act appropriately, there was 
a repertory of action by government actors to deal with the calamity. Publicly, 
members of government showed their concern by visiting the sites of disaster. 
The normal course of action went like this: A politician (minister/ MLA/ gover-
nor, etc.) arrived at the site (spillway, IDP camp in Altit, or an affected village in 
Gojal), in most cases by helicopter and in company of media persons, he deliv-
ered a speech to the people, emphasised what action government had already 
taken, made announcements about future government action and distributed 
some material benefit (cheques, relief) to some of the victims before leaving the 
scene again. 
While members of government ostensibly showed their activities and their 
sympathy with the victims through these on-site visits, most people commented 
that these were “a show only”, intended to mask the government’s actual neglect 
and inactivity. Already an early press conference held in Islamabad on January 
16, 2010, accused the government of holding expensive photo sessions instead 
of taking effective action. Especially in the first months of the disaster, helicop-
ter flights for politicians’ site visits were heavily criticized because they reduced 
the sorties available for the transport of affected persons. As no boat service had 
been established at that time, air transport was needed to move people and goods 
between Gojal and Hunza. 
The “show” did not always consist in distributing cheques. An author writing 
for the news blog Pamir Times told me that shortly before a visit of Qamar 
Zaman Qaira, the then Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan, to the blockade in spring 
2010 the number of excavators working at the spillway had been doubled by the 
FWO – only to be reduced again after the Governor had left.14 
                                                 
13  Two seats in the GBLA are reserved for nominated professionals or “technocrats”. 
14  Stories about Qaira’s visits to the spillway have become a kind of folk genre in Gojal. At 
another visit to the blockade in March, Qaira announced that the government would open 
a spillway and release the water within three weeks. When an elderly man among the au-
dience openly expressed his doubts in this schedule, Qaira barked at him: “Are you an en-
gineer?” “No”, replied the man, “but I know the area and I know that this is impossible.” 
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Events of protest were not less frequent than the visits of members of gov-
ernment. Besides the three events referred to at the beginning of this section I 
would like to mention a few other prominent examples. Most of these events 
were organised by the Rābita Committee. On 4
th
 of April 2010, a protest demon-
stration was held in Gulmit under the title of Yom-e bedāri wa tahfuz-e huqūq-e 
Gojal15 in order to mark the completion of three months after the landslide. A 
member of the Rābita Committee told me that until this date there had been 
protests in Gilgit and in other places, but never in Gojal: “Wazir Baig and his 
fellows were saying that the people in Gojal were quiet, that protests were taking 
place only in Gilgit. Therefore we wanted to show that this was not an issue of 
Gilgit only but of the whole qōm16.” Around 400 people participated in the pro-
test which took place in front of the tahsildar’s office. On the same date follow-
ers of the PPP held another public meeting in Gulmit in order to commemorate 
the death anniversary of party founder Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.17 My interlocutor 
from the Rābita Committee suspected that the PPP organised this meeting only 
after the demonstration had been announced in order to divide public attention. 
At the demonstration demands were raised for the release of the water and for 
the posting of medical doctors at Gulmit, among other things. The protesters 
shouted slogans against the government and a speaker threatened that the youth 
of Gojal would turn towards China if governments of Pakistan and Gilgit-
Baltistan would not fulfil the local demands. A week later it transpired that FIRs 
(First Information Reports)18 had been lodged against eleven of the participants 
of the demonstration. They were charged of blocking the KKH (which was 
blocked by water anyway) and disrupting social order. 
Being disillusioned about the progress of the FWO’s efforts to release the 
water activists planned a demonstration with hatchets and shovels at the site of 
the spillway. On June 17, 2010, several hundreds of protestors came from both 
sides toward the blockade. Police tried to stop movement from Central Hunza 
but failed. Also the spillway was cordoned off by the police but a number of 
people managed to break through and started to dig with their shovels, symboli-
cally attempting to widen the spillway and to increase the outflow of water. 
Digging continued the next day but it was stopped after negotiations with 
NDMA and the Army which promised to intensify and accelerate works. Gov-
ernment imposed Section 144 of the Pakistani Criminal Procedure Code in 
                                                 
15  “Day of vigilance and protection of the rights of Gojal.” 
16  Qōm is an ambiguous concept in Urdu which may refer to descent groups, ethnic or 
linguistic groups or the political nation. 
17  After being ousted by a military coup under General Zia Ul Haq, Bhutto was put under 
trial and executed on 4th of April, 1979. 
18  In Pakistan, an FIR is a document prepared by the police on some offence. Through issu-
ing an FIR the process of criminal prosecution is set in motion. 
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Hunza which bans assembly of more than five persons in public. The Home Sec-
retary of Gilgit-Baltistan, Asif Bilal Lodhi, termed the protestors as “agents of 
the enemies of Pakistan” and threatened them with detention and criminal 
cases.19 
A final example of protest which I would like to mention was the first anni-
versary of the landslide which was announced as “Black Day”. On 4
th
 of January 
2011, protest meetings were held in Gulmit, in Central Hunza and in Gilgit. 
Section 144 was imposed on Hunza again but protest meetings could not be pre-
vented. In many places, a qarardār (resolution) was proclaimed and distributed 
in which the demands of the Rābita Committee were listed. In Gulmit, a demon-
stration took place in front of the tahsil office, speeches against the Government 
were delivered and tyres were burnt on the ice of the frozen lake. FIRs were is-
sued against all speakers at the protest in Gulmit. 
Protest action was not limited to the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan. Since the 
1960s many Gojalis have migrated in search of work and education to the cities 
of Pakistan, especially to Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad. A strong 
network of kinship and village ties connects migrants in these places with 
Gojalis in Gilgit-Baltistan. In many cities, Gojalis formed local associations, 
especially student associations, which also organised public meetings concern-
ing the disaster. On February 23, 2010, a “token hunger strike” was initiated in 
Karachi and on 28
th
 of the same month two hundred students from Gojal staged 
a demonstration in front of the Lahore Press Club, demanding relief and reha-
bilitation for the disaster victims. At least three press conferences were organ-
ised in Islamabad. Young people from Gojal also called on persons of public 
interest in Pakistan in order to enlist their support. In Lahore, for instance, Gojali 
students met with Asma Jahangir of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. 
Further, activities were not limited to Pakistan. Also in New York migrants from 
Gojal organised meetings in support of the disaster victims. 
 
7. The role of the media 
Public appearances by government officials and protest events are performances 
which aimed at gaining public attention either for the government’s commitment 
or for the protestors’ message of government’s negligence. Accordingly, media 
attention was considered important and a short paragraph on media in the con-
text of the Attabad disaster is in order. A number of protest events were explic-
itly held as press conferences and government officials on site-visits were usu-
ally accompanied by journalists. Yet the political economy of public attention in 
                                                 
19  Pamir Times, June 18, 2010. Available online: http://pamirtimes.net/2010/06/18/those-
widening-the-spillway-are-agents-of-the-enemies-of-pakistan-home-secretary-gb/ (ac-
cessed April 18, 2011). 
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Pakistan was not very favourable for the concerns of the Attabad disaster. Gen-
erally, Gilgit-Baltistan does not receive much attention in the Pakistani public 
sphere. Most Pakistanis have at best very dim ideas about the high-mountain 
area. While national TV networks did not report on the disaster for almost three 
and a half months, some English language newspapers like the daily Dawn 
which had a local correspondent in the area reported from the beginning. 
The most important news source concerning the disaster is the Internet-blog 
Pamir Times. Pamir Times had been established by two young activists from 
Gojal, Zulfiqar Ali and Noor Mohammad, in late 2006. The blog is organised as 
a community, non-profit enterprise which publishes all kinds of news items re-
lated to Gilgit-Baltistan in general and Hunza/Gojal in particular. Around thirty 
persons based in different places are registered as “community journalists” with 
Pamir Times who supply texts, photos and sometimes short videos. With on av-
erage more than 2,000 visitors per day Pamir Times has become the most im-
portant online news portal on Gilgit-Baltistan. Most of its readers are based out-
side of Gojal. Within the region, there is no Internet café and very few inhabit-
ants possess web compatible mobile phones or mobile internet access. Yet 
Pamir Times very effectively links Gojali migrants across Pakistan – and the 
world – with their area of origin. 
The outreach of Pamir Times goes beyond its direct readership as it is used 
as source by other media. Especially many photographs of the disaster were ap-
propriated by other media, often without giving proper credit, and frequently the 
activists of Pamir Times were interviewed by newspapers or TV channels. Paki-
stani national TV channels like Geo started to report about the disaster only after 
it had become a more direct concern for Pakistan. In March 2010 an intense de-
bate started about a possible breach of the blockade and a sudden outburst of the 
lake which would inundate hundreds of villages downstream the rivers Hunza, 
Gilgit and Indus. Such a breach would not have been without historical prece-
dent: In the mid 19
th
 century a landslide dammed the Hunza River at roughly the 
same place. That time the pressure of the dammed water broke through the 
blockade and a huge wave rushed down the valleys. A Sikh army which camped 
at Attock on the banks of the Indus was washed away.20 From March on most 
TV channels and news networks sent their teams to Hunza and Gojal to report 
on the disaster and the feared danger. Yet media attention faded again when the 
Attabad disaster was eclipsed by the larger catastrophe of the floods that hit 
Pakistan from end of July 2010 onwards. Protestors hoped to revive public and 
media attention through the activities planned for the “Black Day” of the disas-
                                                 
20  In order to prevent such a disaster, more than 20,000 people living along the rivers were 
evacuated for several weeks in 2010 until it became clear that the blockade was much too 
massive to break. 
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ter anniversary on January 4, 2011. But on this day public interest was captured 
by the murder of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in Islamabad. 
While press and electronic media are significant for wider public attention of 
the disaster, news were conveyed to the more directly concerned public, i.e. 
most importantly people in and from Gojal, by means of text messages sent via 
mobile phones. Text messages informed about current developments and also 
called for action like participation in a protest. An exemplary text message reads 
like this: 
Dist. Amnstn H/N has started illegal shifting of the remaining qty of 3500 begs of 
chinese relief atta 2 downstrm despite ban on shift of any kind of relief goods 
from Gojal. We strongly condemn this animity against Gojali public. Pls raise ur 




8. Agents of protest and opposition 
While it may seem natural that the people affected by the disaster criticize the 
government and protest against insufficient support, it is still important to have a 
closer look at those who protested. The first protest mentioned at the beginning 
of this section was organised by the Progressive Youth Front (PYF). The PYF is 
headed by Baba Jan, a political activist from Nasirabad, Hunza, who in the po-
litical context of Gilgit-Baltistan is considered a leftist and nationalist. The PYF 
is not an organisation of people from Attabad or from Gojal. In Gilgit-Baltistan, 
“nationalist” is a designation for activists and groups who challenge Pakistan’s 
control over the area. I mention this not to put the PYFs genuine concern for the 
disaster into question but rather to point out that from the beginning the politics 
of the Attabad disaster was framed within the coordinates of larger political 
contention of Gilgit-Baltistan. Even more outspokenly “nationalist”, that is, 
openly demanding the independence of the Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan, is the 
Balawaristan National Front (BNF) that together with the Rābita Committee 
organised protest in Gilgit on January 27.22 
In contrast to the BNF and PYF the Rābita Committee is a loose network of 
activists formed after the disaster by people from Gojal. While the BNF or other 
nationalist groups quite often stage protests in Gilgit, a joint event of BNF and 
activists from Gojal is much less likely. This is not to say that Gojalis are gener-
                                                 
21  This message circulated on March 5, 2011 and was written in typical sms-language. A 
“translation” of the text would read like this: “District administration Hunza-Nager has 
started illegal shifting of the remaining quantity of 3,500 bags of Chinese relief flour [atta] 
to downstream despite ban on shift of any kind of relief goods from Gojal. We strongly 
condemn this enmity against Gojali public. Please raise your voice. Please forward to all.” 
22  The BNF which has split into two factions is dominated by people from Punial and Ghizer 
districts. On nationalism in Gilgit-Baltistan and the BNF see Sökefeld 1999, 2005. 
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ally content about the political system of Gilgit-Baltistan. But their goal for po-
litical change is rather the opposite of what nationalists envision: Instead of in-
dependence, people from Gojal (and Hunza in general) mostly demand the com-
plete integration of Gilgit-Baltistan as fifth province into the Pakistani state. 
Gojalis, including the activists of the Rābita Committee, are generally represent-
atives of what the nationalists despise as wafadārī (loyalism). Although the 
Committee sometimes cooperated with the nationalists, its activists did not share 
their ideology. A young activist of the Rābita Committee told me: “In the free-
dom struggle of 1947 our elders decided for Pakistan. Although Pakistan keeps 
us in a colonialised status, we honour our elders’ decision and opt for Paki-
stan.”23 
The Rābita Committee became the most important agent of protest in the 
context of the Attabad disaster. The common political denominator for the ma-
jority of its activists is that already before the disaster they were opponents of 
the current PPP-government. In the shape of the Rābita Committee a decade-old 
political antagonism came to the surface again. Many people in Gojal hold the 
PPP in high esteem because its founder Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto abolished the op-
pressive regime of the Mir of Hunza.24 The Mir effectively controlled the move-
ment of his subjects and people from Gojal were generally not allowed to leave 
the state. During the 1960s, however, the Mir’s grip weakened to some extent 
and some Wakhis from Gojal who opposed his rule managed to escape to 
Karachi. In the city they aligned themselves with the PPP which was established 
in 1967. 
However, not all inhabitants of Gojal were opponents of the Mir’s rule. 
Among his supporters were Burushos settled in Gojal, some of whom were rela-
tives of the Mir, and also some Wakhis who enjoyed privileges, especially in 
terms of taxation. The Mir’s family wields considerable political influence even 
today and the old distinction of the Mir’s opponents versus his supporters is still 
relevant. The Mir’s opponents are generally followers of the PPP. Ghazanfar Ali 
Khan, the son of the last ruling Mir Mohammad Jamal Khan, was member of the 
Northern Areas Legislative Council (the predecessor of the GBLA) and also 
held the now abolished office of the Deputy Chief Executive of the Northern 
Areas. He sided with the Pakistan Muslim League and, after General Musharraf 
had seized power in Pakistan, with the PML-Q, that is the faction of the Muslim 
League which supported the military ruler. 
After the PPP had won the elections of the GBLA and took government, the 
Mir’s supporters became “the opposition”. The opposition now dominates the 
                                                 
23  On the freedom struggle of 1947 in Gilgit see Sökefeld 1997b. 
24  Bhutto was the first President and Prime Minister of Pakistan who took considerable inter-
est in Gilgit-Baltistan. It can be assumed that he intended to turn the region into a province 
of Pakistan. On Bhutto and Gilgit-Baltistan see Sökefeld 1997a: 290ff. 
200 Martin Sökefeld 
 
 
Rābita Committee. Although also many supporters of the PPP find it now diffi-
cult to enthusiastically defend the Government’s performance of disaster man-
agement25, they mostly shun from aligning themselves with the Rābita Commit-
tee. Conversely, the Rābita Committee also tried to exclude PPP supporters, at 
least in its formative phase. Still, the Committee is not restricted to allies of the 
Mir. A few years ago, another political contestant surfaced in Gojal in the shape 
of the Mutahida Qomi Movement (United National Movement, MQM). The 
MQM came into being as the party of Mohajirs in Karachi and Hyderabad, i.e. 
as Mohajir Qomi Movement (Mohajir National Movement) but was renamed in 
1997. Since then the party tries to position itself as a liberal, secular party for the 
whole of Pakistan and not simply as a parochial representative of Mohajir inter-
est in Sindh. People from Hunza and Gojal who lived in Karachi established the 
party in these areas. Now, also followers of the MQM are part of the Rābita 
Committee. Also the first convenor of the Rābita Committee was a supporter of 
the MQM. 
The Rābita Committee does not only criticize the PPP-government for taking 
insufficient action in coping with the disaster but also for corruption and for 
subverting local institutions. It is alleged, for instance, that the LSOs in Gojal 
are largely dominated by followers of the PPP. Charges of corruption refer most 
importantly favouritism in the distribution of relief in general and the “fraud” 
concerning the fuel gifted by China in particular. 
However, not only PPP and government are criticized by the Rābita Com-
mittee. Although much less outspoken, critique is also extended to Ismaili insti-
tutions like AKDN and the Ismaili Councils. Here, the reproach is that at least 
initially these institutions largely kept silent in the public debate about the dis-
aster. When in the first months after the landslide various options to prevent the 
flooding of Gojal were discussed and it was obvious that the government was 
not willing, perhaps for strategic reasons, to enlist the help of international or-
ganisations and companies, many Gojalis expected AKDN – and AKRSP in 
particular – to speak up for them. But AKDN kept conspicuously silent. 
AKDN’s reluctance to raise a voice conforms to the organisation’s general pol-
icy not to act openly politically and not to confront government, in other words, 
to “work with government” (emphasis added) and not against it (Najam 2006). 
This can be seen as a general political maxim of Ismailis in Pakistan. The spir-
itual head of the Ismailiyya, the Aga Khan, demands that his followers are al-
ways loyal to their respective state and government.26 An important rationale for 
                                                 
25  Defence of the government is rather lukewarm. For example, a staunch PPP supporter told 
me in an interview: “The government is assisting the [affected] people. But the process is 
very slow.” 
26  This is also an important reason for the reluctance of people in Hunza and Gojal to support 
nationalist organisations in Gilgit-Baltistan. It does not mean, however, that all Ismailis 
 
The Attabad landslide and the politics of disaster in Gojal, Gilgit-Baltistan 201 
 
 
this political caution is that in the country’s religious and political context 
Ismailis occupy a precarious and vulnerable position. Ismailis are considered as 
being “heterodox” by many representatives of majority Islam and it has repeat-
edly been demanded to formally exclude them from the fold of Islam.27 Society 
in Gilgit town is characterised by strict and often violent polarisation between 
Shias and Sunnis which radiates across the whole of Gilgit-Baltistan. So far, 
Ismailis have been successful in largely keeping aloof of sectarianism and this is 
another reason for keeping a low profile. Still, in a situation of extreme emer-
gency when entire villages were drowning, many Ismailis in Gojal had expected 
AKRSP to offer more outspoken advocacy and support. In this context, the es-
tablishment of the emergency field office in Gulmit can be seen as an assertion 
that AKRSP “does not leave the disaster victims alone”, as an employee of the 
organisation told me. 
While a lot of relief work has been undertaken by AKRSP and other organi-
sations, by China and also the government of Pakistan, the demands and expec-
tations of the Rābita Committee and the affected people of Gojal are far from 
being fulfilled. While relief is generally appreciated, the principal demand is the 
draining of the water. This is also the first point in the long list of demands of 
the resolution published on the “Black Day” of 4 January 2011: “It has to be 
made sure that the water of Attabad Lake is immediately released.” 
Below the threshold of political activism there is the widespread feeling 
among the affected population of Gojal that the government does not really take 
interest in their calamity. Koi pūchnewālā nahīn hai! is a frequently heard ex-
pression of this sentiment: “Nobody cares for us!” Many people in Gojal assume 
by now that the government is not really interested in the draining of the lake 
and the recovery of lost land and houses but only in lowering of the water level 
to the extent that most of the KKH comes out again so that trade with China, 
which is the main economic interest in the area, can be resumed on its previous 
scale. 
Some activists of the Rābita Committee make a connection between protest 
and relief operations. For them, relief is intended also to silence the protest and 
to divert the people’s attention from their real demand, the draining of the lake. 
“Indeed”, one activist told me in November 2010, “there was no public protest 
in Gojal after the Chinese relief had arrived.” 
In any case, to publicly stage protest was a new key in the politics of Gojal. 
A member of the Rābita Committee told me: “It is part of our culture that we 
accept whatever the government says. But when it turned out that all govern-
                                                 
comply with this maxim. The main leaders of the BNF, for instance, are Ismailis, too, 
hailing, however, from other areas of Gilgit-Baltistan. 
27  This happened to the Ahmadis in 1974 who since then suffer severe discrimination and 
persecution in the country. 
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ment announcements and promises were fake we felt compelled to take to the 
road and to express our protest.” 
A younger activist added at another occasion:  
In the beginning we had the problem that we did not know how to protest. On TV 
we see protests [in Pakistan] where people burn tyres and effigies and shout 
‘death to so and so!’ But we never did such things ourselves. Our approach was 
always intellectual. We organised a meeting, invited some politician and conveyed 
him our demands. But this issue was so huge and our approach did not work. We 
had to learn to shout slogans and threats, to make much noise, etc. Unless you do 
this, nobody will listen and nothing will happen. 
But not everybody in Gojal appreciated this new mode of public politics. Es-
pecially elderly people were very proud of the peacefulness of the region and 
felt ashamed for youngsters who assembled on the road making noise and 
shouting slogans against the government. 
 
9. Politics of disaster and the political dynamics of Gilgit-Baltistan 
According to Jenness, Smith and Stepan-Norris (2006: ix), natural disasters offer 
a “particularly compelling empirical window” for the examination of social pro-
cesses. What, then do the politics of the Attabad disaster tell about political pro-
cesses in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan? First of all, the politics of disaster take 
place within a context of previous and ongoing contestations. Although the 
damming of the Hunza River and the development of the lake was a severe dis-
ruption of routines and brought a radically new situation, public political action 
continued from previous constellations. The disaster was immediately drawn 
into the political game of pitting opposition against government. Instead of 
bringing new actors to the fore, the politics of disaster rather open a new arena 
for an ongoing struggle between old contestants. The dominant divide of politics 
in Gojal and Hunza, the opposition between supporters of the PPP and the parti-
sans of the Mir dominates the politics of disaster, too. Beyond the political con-
text of Hunza and Gojal also the contestants in the wider political framework of 
Gilgit-Baltistan find a new arena in the disaster: Nationalist groups entered dis-
aster politics, trying to find new and quite unlikely allies. Still, the disaster 
brought also political change to Gojal, most importantly a change in the style of 
“doing politics”. The self-representation of Gojal as an abode of peacefulness 
and loyalty was disturbed by young men shouting slogans against the govern-
ment on a stretch of the KKH in Gulmit which had still escaped inundation. It is 
not yet clear to what extent such agitation will become part of the regular reper-
tory of political action in Gojal, but in any case a precedent has been set. In 
spring 2011 there was also a public protest meeting by elderly people in 
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Gulmit.28 A friend wrote me that this protest was staged by erstwhile supporters 
of the PPP who had become disillusioned about government. 
Further, the politics of disaster reveal the highly ambivalent conception of 
government which generally pervades politics in Pakistan. The government is 
known to lack resources and to be weak – it is generally accepted that the army 
and the bureaucracy are much more powerful institutions in Pakistan than gov-
ernment – but still it is burdened with high and mostly unaccomplishable ex-
pectations. While on the one hand public confidence in government is very lim-
ited, it is on the other hand held responsible for almost everything. Representa-
tives of government do little to reduce expectations. To the contrary, they con-
tinue to make all kinds of promises. Public appearances of government repre-
sentatives mostly take place in a mode of elān, of making announcements. Thus, 
members of government announced that the water of Attabad Lake would be 
released within two weeks, that the level of the lake would soon be lowered by 
thirty meters, that IDPs would be resettled, or that funds for compensation 
would soon be released, to mention just a few examples of still unfulfilled 
promises. 
Practically, government did not matter too much in Gojal before the land-
slide happened. In fact, over the last three decades AKDN had established a kind 
of parallel administration which cared for almost all local needs that were ne-
glected by the authorities: education, health, rural and community development, 
finance, and even, to some extent, infrastructure. The people of Gojal lived in a 
sort of state of benign neglect by the government of Pakistan, largely untouched 
by many issues which dominate politics in the country. Yet the landslide 
brought a disaster that was too large to be handled by AKDN. People who des-
pairingly saw the water rise to devour their fields and houses expected that gov-
ernment prevented the unfolding of disaster but were utterly disappointed. Many 
promises were not delivered and relief efforts were pervaded by another con-
stant of politics in Pakistan: corruption. 
The contestation following Attabad also shows that politics in Gojal is not 
territorially confined. In consequence of migration a translocal network of ac-
tivists now reinforced by electronic communication developed through which 
political action could be extended to the major cities of Pakistan. This enables a 
kind of public political representation in Pakistan which, in consequence of the 
internationally disputed status, the area lacks in the country’s formal political 
setup. 
In the perception of many people in Gojal and in Gilgit-Baltistan in general, 
the status quo of being dependent on, yet unrepresented in Pakistan considerably 
contributes to the region’s vulnerability. While the flood-affected constituencies 
                                                 
28  http://pamirtimes.net/2011/04/23/elders-of-gojal-protest-against-the-government-for-not-
fulfilling-promises/ (accessed May 9, 2011). 
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in Pakistan can expect their representative in the National Assembly to press 
issues of relief and reconstruction because he or she wants to be re-elected, 
Gilgit-Baltistan has no representatives to put forward demands at the federal 
level.29 The reform package which was passed in September 2009 by the govern-
ment of Pakistan under the bold name of “Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and 
Self-Governance) Order” brought no relief in this respect. According to the per-
spectives of my interlocutors which also included PPP supporters, this package 
did not do more than change the name of “Northern Areas” to “Gilgit-Baltistan” 
and turning the Northern Areas Legislative Council into the Gilgit-Baltistan 
Legislative Assembly, without, however adding any legislative powers. 
 
10. Conclusion 
Politics is a significant dimension of the Attabad disaster. In local perspective, it 
is largely failed politics that ultimately turned a “natural” event into human ca-
lamity, and therefore the disaster has to be approached politically, not only by 
technical or managerial means. Yet politics of disaster do not constitute a new, 
detached arena of political contention. To the contrary, it almost seamlessly 
blends into general competition for power in Gojal and Gilgit-Baltistan. 
The question of change and continuity is a recurrent theme in the sociology 
and anthropology of disasters. Being events of apparently utterly disruptive na-
ture, many researchers expected that disasters generate rapid and pervasive so-
cial change. Yet many research outcomes show that after disasters continuity 
largely prevails over change (Henry 2011): “Disasters do not generate change in 
and of themselves, but rather intensify or accelerate pre-existing patters” (Com-
mittee on Disaster Research 2006: 166, quoted after Henry 2011: 224). The de-
velopment after the Attabad landslide confirms this assessment. But continuity 
can also lead to escalation: On August 11, 2011, Gilgit-Baltistan’s Chief Minis-
ter Syed Mehdi Shah was scheduled to visit Hunza yet a group of angry IDPs 
blocked the road in Aliabad, demanding the release of funds for compensation. 
They confronted the Police that wanted to clear the road. A shuffle ensued in the 
course of which a policeman shot into the group, killing two persons and injur-
ing three more. In response, over the next days crowds of angry protestors led by 
nationalist activists attacked government offices in Hunza and demonstrations 
took place in Gojal, Central Hunza, Gilgit, Islamabad and Karachi. The govern-
ment, in turn, arrested a number of activists. Thus, the antagonism between “the 
                                                 
29  However, one Member of National Assembly, Marvi Memon of PML-Q, has become a 
strong advocate of Gilgit-Baltistan in the Pakistani Parliament. After the disaster, Memon 
visited Hunza and Gojal several times and also met activists from Gojal in Islamabad. At 
the Pakistani national level she has become the most committed critic of the government’s 
disaster management. 
The Attabad landslide and the politics of disaster in Gojal, Gilgit-Baltistan 205 
 
 
people” and “the government” became relevant and visible to an unprecedented 
extent. 
At the time of writing the issue is still unresolved. As those who have lost 
their homes due to landslide or lake have not yet been resettled, a phase of re-
construction after the disaster has not yet been reached in any meaningful sense. 
Rather, the phase of relief which is characterised by dependency and uncertainty 
about what future will bring is prolonged. It has brought, in fact, only short-term 
relief and in the affected areas life continues in a kind of interim phase the end 
of which is not yet visible. The disaster is by no means over. The Attabad case 
shows, then, that not only reconstruction can be pervaded by political antago-
nism and contradictions of interests but that already before reconstruction takes 
place politics can be a significant dimension of disaster – perhaps especially 
when relief and reconstruction efforts are perceived as being delayed and utterly 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
AKDN  Aga Khan Development Network 
AKRSP  Aga Khan Rural Support Programme 
FIR   First Information Report 
FWO   Frontier Works Organisation 
GBLA  Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly 
IDPs   Internally Displaced Persons 
KKH   Karakorum Highway 
LSO   Local Support Organisation 
MASO  Mountain Support Organisation 
MQM Mohajir Qomi Movement, later renamed as Muttahida Qomi 
Movement 
NDMA  National Disaster Management Authority 
PKR   Pakistani Rupee 
PML-N  Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz 
PML-Q  Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid 
PPP   Pakistan Peoples’s Party 
VO/WOs  Village Organisations/Women Organisations 
WFP   World Food Programme 
